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Abstract
This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of Tarski’s semantic background in the light
of the ideas of his master, Stanis law Le"sniewski. Although in his 1933 monograph Tarski credits
Le"sniewski with crucial negative results on the semantics of natural language, the conceptual
relationship between the two logicians has never been investigated in a thorough manner. This
paper shows that it was not Tarski, but Le"sniewski who /rst avowed the impossibility of giving
a satisfactory theory of truth for ordinary language, and the necessity of sanitation of the latter
for scienti/c purposes. In an early article (1913) Le"sniewski gave an interesting solution to
the Liar Paradox, which, although di2erent from Tarski’s in detail, is nevertheless important to
Tarski’s semantic background. To illustrate this I give an analysis of Le"sniewski’s solution and
of some related aspects of Le"sniewski’s later thought.
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1. A well-entrenched conviction
There is a well-entrenched conviction about Alfred Tarski which is shared by a
large number of philosophers: it was Tarski who /rst showed, in his epoch-making
monograph on truth, that semantical paradoxes demonstrate that natural language is
hopelessly infected with contradiction, and must be sanitized before any serious talk
on truth can begin. 1 The well-entrenched conviction is, however, demonstrably wrong.
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1 Cf. Burge [6], p. 169: “At the core of Tarski’s theory of truth and validity was a diagnosis of the Liar
Paradox according to which natural language was hopelessly infected with contradiction. Tarski construed
himself as treating the disease by replacing ordinary discourse with a sanitized, arti/cial construction”.
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The idea comes from Stanis law Le"sniewski, and not from Tarski, his sole doctoral
student.
Although Tarski was responsible for wrong-doings towards Le"sniewski, he cannot
be blamed for having contributed to this particular historical distortion. When going
through the negative results on natural language in the /rst chapter of his famous work
on truth, Tarski himself explicitly credits his master with them.
The considerations which I shall put forward in this connexion 〈i.e. the discussion
of the various diEculties which meet the attempts to solve the problem of the
de/nition of truth in application to the ordinary language, A:B:〉 are, for the most
part, not the result of my own studies. Views are expressed in them which have
been developed by S. Le"sniewski in his lectures at the University of Warsaw
(from the academic year 1919/20 onwards), in scienti/c discussions and in private
conversations; this applies, in particular, to almost everything which I shall say
about expressions in quotation marks and the semantical antinomies [...]. 2
It is not Tarski’s fault, thus, if the demonstration of the impossibility of a formally
correct and materially adequate truth-de/nition for natural language, as well as the
considerations concerning its semantic closure, and about the diEculties linked with
quotation marks, are almost without exception attributed to him and not to Le"sniewski. 3
This well-entrenched conviction is prevalent in that part of the scholarly world which
is not familiar with Polish analytic philosophy, or at least not with Le"sniewski. Among
those philosophers who are, instead, suEciently conversant with this philosophical ter-
ritory, Tarski’s words are taken at face value. But even if for some Le"sniewski’s role in
the /rst chapter of Tarski’s book is not news, no one has so far provided us with much
more than the disconsolate remark that we /nd no treatment of semantic paradoxes in
Le"sniewski’s writings. 4
Here is the novelty: there is written evidence that Le"sniewski had /rst the idea of
sanitation, and so we need not make do with oral or third-party testimony. We do have a
treatment of paradoxes by Le"sniewski, only it does not belong among Le"sniewski’s ma-
ture works. Le"sniewski published a solution to the Liar Paradox in 1913, in a neglected
paper in Polish called “Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middle”, 5
where he rejected natural language as an adequate means for scienti/c analysis.
To the best of my knowledge, hardly anyone has so far noticed Le"sniewski’s Liar, let
alone understood its importance in spelling out Tarski’s semantic background. 6 As a
matter of fact, generally speaking Le"sniewski’s inIuence upon Tarski is recognized, 7
but the conceptual links between them have not yet been thoroughly investigated.
2 Cf. Tarski [45], p. 4 n. 3 ( = [54], p. 17 n. 3); [46], p. 267; quoted from [50], p. 155 n. 1. Translations
from Polish are mine unless otherwise indicated.
3 As do among others, Davidson [8], pp. 27 and 2., [9], pp. 71–72, [10], p. 80, pp. 81–82; Haack [13]—
where Tarski’s [45] and [46] are unwittingly and plurally referred to as “Tarski 1931”—pp. 102, 104–105,
120. Field [12], p. 353 n. 9 attributes to Tarski even Le"sniewski’s notion of semantic category.
4 Cf. Wole"nski [56], p. 122 n. 4.
5 Cf. Le"sniewski [24].
6 The exception is Rojszczak [36], p. 159.
7 Cf. for instance Wole"nski and Simons [57], pp. 422, 425–426.
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My main aim will be to show that such an investigation must start with Le"sniewski’s
so-called ‘prelogistic phase’. This is, however, only part of the story, and it is not
meant to dispute the fact that the most relevant inIuence on Tarski was exerted by
Le"sniewski’s more mature thought.
A thorough account of the latter fact is, nevertheless, rather diEcult to give, owing to
the intricacies in the development of Le"sniewski’s ideas and the lack of textual sources.
In the /nal sections of the present paper I attempt, however, a preliminary analysis
of two aspects connected with the mature Le"sniewski. My account is not exhaustive,
and an open-ended epilogue is to be expected: a comprehensive reconstruction of the
Le"sniewskian background of Tarski’s semantics would need a broader historical context
in which to embed Le"sniewski’s and Tarski’s contrasting attitudes towards logic, and
it would go far beyond the scope of the present contribution.
I would like to stress, though, that however indispensable Le"sniewski’s contribu-
tion to Tarski’s negative results regarding natural language was, I attempt in no way
to diminish Tarski’s positive results. In particular, as will be clearer in the follow-
ing, Tarski’s own solution to the Liar is quite di2erent from Le"sniewski’s early one,
nor does the cure he proposes for the illnesses of natural language coincide with his
master’s mature remedy.
2. Lesniewski’s early semantics
Le"sniewski’s Liar is to be found in an early paper which Le"sniewski later disowned,
together with other three, as immature and very de/cient. 8 If we want to avoid mis-
understandings as to what the trademark ‘Le"sniewski’ should or should not be attached
to, this fact is vital to bear in mind. Although in the early writings we /nd typical
traits that Le"sniewski maintained also later, some ideas are characteristic of this period
only, and cannot be carried over to his mature thought.
The chronology of Le"sniewski’s writings is usually seen as falling into two main
periods, with a transitional one in the middle: the early period (1911–1914), compris-
ing /ve papers, the so-called ‘prelogistic’ writings; the ‘bridging work’ of 1916 on
Mereology; /nally, the mature, ‘logistic’ writings (1927–1938), in which Le"sniewski
sets out part of the architecture of the logical systems and mature formal results. Al-
though this partition of Le"sniewski’s oeuvre is questionable, it is certainly adequate for
my purposes here. 9
Le"sniewski’s early works are devoted to a critical assessment of fundamental logico-
semantic and ontological principles of traditional logic. In this he was inspired by
 Lukasiewicz, who, in the same period, was engaged in a similar, although radically
opposed, project. 10 Le"sniewski’s solution to the Liar in the “Critique of the Logical
Principle of the Excluded Middle” (‘Critique’ henceforth) is conceived within the
framework of this general reconsideration of the classical logical heritage.
8 Cf. Le"sniewski [27], pp. 182–183. Eng. tran. pp. 197–198. The rejected papers are Le"sniewski [21–24].
9 For some objections to the standard chronology, cf. my [2].
10 Cf. Betti [5].
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The semantic notions and the logical principles on which Le"sniewski’s solution is
based are exposed in the following. Note that his perspective here is rather traditional
in the sense of a traditional logic of terms.
1. The main aim of the Critique, to which Le"sniewski’s solution to the Liar is strictly
connected, is to show that the logical principle of excluded middle is false. Despite
this latter apparent oddity, Le"sniewski is very faithful to classical and old-fashioned
logical views, something which was to become also typical of his logical systems.
The oddity is easily explained. By ‘Logical Principle of the Excluded Middle’
(Logical Tertium Non Datur) Le"sniewski understands
LTND: At least one of two mutually contradictory (sprzeczne) sentences [of the form
‘a is b’ and ‘a is not b’] must be true. 11
According to Le"sniewski, LTND is false, because there are pairs of contradictory
sentences for which it does not hold, i.e. there are cases in which ‘a is b’ and ‘a is not
b’ are both false. One may wonder how this is at all possible if we are to understand
correctly the notion of contradiction considered in LTND. The truth of the matter is
that here Le"sniewski’s ‘contradiction’ is in fact a weaker notion, resulting in some
cases in a mere contrariety of the sentences under consideration (for which, as is well
known in traditional logic, the excluded middle fails). This, in turn, derives from the
notion of negation which Le"sniewski considers, namely (predicate) term negation. In
the sentence ‘contradicting’ ‘a is b’, i.e. its denial ‘a is not b’, negation is understood
as in ‘a is non-b’. 12
Le"sniewski shows that LTND is false in virtue of his conditions of truth for
wellformed sentences, i.e. for sentences reduced to the canonical form ‘a is b’:
L1 ‘a’ is a denotative name;
L2 ‘b’ is a connotative name;
L3 the object(s) denoted by ‘a’ possess(es) the property/ies connoted by ‘b’. 13
Here ‘denotation’ and ‘connotation’ are taken more or less in John Stuart Mill’s
sense. 14 Denotative names refer to one or more objects; non-denotative names, like
‘Pegasus’, ‘round square’ and so on, do not refer to anything. Connotative names are
those which refer to some properties; more technically, they are those names that can
be de/ned per genus proximum et di;erentiam speci<cam. ‘Being connotative’ for
Le"sniewski is synonymous with ‘being meaningful’, therefore an expression is conno-
tative i2 it is meaningful i2 it can be de/ned per genus proximum et di;erentiam
speci<cam. From L1 and L2 follows that if a is non-denotative (or empty, if you like)
or b is non-connotative, both ‘a is b’ and ‘a is non-b’ are false, and therefore LTND
11 Cf. Le"sniewski [24], Section 7, p. 343; Eng. tran. p. 76.
12 For a closer analysis of a perfect counterpart of this point in  Lukasiewicz, cf. Betti [4]. Cf. also n. 39
infra.
13 Cf. Le"sniewski [24], Section 3, pp. 324–325; Eng. tran. p. 57; Le"sniewski [22], Sections 5–6, p. 212;
Eng. tran. p. 31.
14 “A connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute [: : :] the word white, denote
all white things [: : :] and implies, or in the language of the schoolmen, connotes the attribute whiteness”,
Mill [34], p. 31. Strictly speaking, as for Le"sniewski there are connotative but non-denotative names, like
‘round square’, Mill’s de/nition does not really /t his position.
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does not hold. Consequently, Le"sniewski accepts a weaker principle, the ‘Principle of
Contradictory Sentences or Restricted Excluded Middle’ (RLTND):
RLTND: If one among two sentences of the form ‘a is b’ and ‘a is non-b’ is false,
the other is true i2 its subject is denotative and its predicate is connotative.
Among other principles which Le"sniewski defends are the Ontological Principle of
Contradiction (OPC), the Logical Principle of Contradiction (LPC), and the Ontological
Principle of the Excluded Middle (OTND):
OPC: No object may at the same time possess and not possess the same property;
LPC: If one of two mutually contradictory sentences [of the form ‘a is b’ and ‘a is
not b’] is true, the other is false.
OTND: Every object a has either the property b or else non-b
Note that a special case of OTND is the Principle of Bivalence, truth and falsity
being properties of sentences as special objects (‘non-true’ equals ‘false’). 15
2. The issue of the Critique directly relevant for us is the testing of Le"sniewski’s
semantical apparatus vis-Sa-vis a series of famous paradoxes. Some paradoxes disappear
by merely showing that the pairs of ‘contradictory’ sentences of which the paradox
consists have an empty subject. In order to solve the Liar, however, Le"sniewski is
forced to introduce the following convention, as he terms such logico-semantic rules,
the sole brand-new one of the Critique. It can be re-written as follows: 16
K: For every token-expression W connoting the properties b1 : : : bn and for every
object o; W denotes o i2 o possesses the properties b1 : : : bn, with the exception of
the case in which o is W itself and of the case in which o is an object having any
constitutive part in common with W . 17
Le"sniewski speaks of the parts of the very token expression W , i.e. a concrete
meaningful (because connotative) occurrence made up of sounds or signs, as if he
spoke of a concrete part of a chair or of a stone—in this (but only in this) K is
similar to his later metalinguistic mereological terminology. 18 Let me give an example
to explain what K says. Suppose you have the token ‘English expression’ written
on a certain blackboard in a certain place M1. Other English expressions are written
on the same blackboard in other places M2;M3; : : : ;M6: ‘Prague’ in M2, ‘Castle’ in
M3, ‘English’ in M4, ‘Expression’ in M5, ‘English expression’ in M6. K says that
‘English expression’ M1 denotes ‘Prague’ M2, ‘Castle’ M3, ‘English’ M4, ‘Expression’
M5, ‘English expression’ M6, but it does not denote ‘English expression’ M1 (itself),
‘English’ or ‘expression’ as constitutive parts of ‘English expression’ M1. 19
15 The elements ad 1. are already presented in the two articles that precede the Critique, cf. Le"sniewski
[21,22].
16 See for instance Le"sniewski [22], Section 2, Remark III, p. 205; Eng. tran. p. 23. The terminology
immediately brings to mind Tarski’s Convention T—although in the original Tarski has the Slavonic ‘umowa’
and Le"sniewski here the Latin ‘konwencja’.
17 Cf. Le"sniewski [24], Remark to Section 4, p. 331; Eng. tran. p. 64.
18 See the Terminological Explanations in Le"sniewski [29], pp. 63–68; Eng. tran. pp. 472–485.
19 Cf. Le"sniewski [24], Remark IV to Section 1, p. 332; Eng. tran. pp. 64–65 is really bad: the translator
for instance renders “the English expression ‘Polish [instead of ‘English’] expression” ’, which does not
make sense.
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3. The following is also laid down:
TL: For every a and b, ‘a is b’ is true i2 a is b. 20
Note that TL is in no sense or circumstance taken as a de<nition of the predicate
‘true’.
4. Le"sniewski observes the use/mention distinction with scrupulous care, to a de-
gree far beyond what was common among his contemporaries. 21 The reason for such
unusual attention has been linked to the fact that Le"sniewski had already by that
time recognized and applied the language/metalanguage distinction. Indeed, some pas-
sages from Le"sniewski’s early writings suggest this line of thought, and some scholars,
notably Surma and Lejewski, ascribed Le"sniewski’s ‘discovery’ of the latter, funda-
mental distinction to the very beginning of his activity. The whole issue depends,
among other things, on whether we are ready to identify the use/mention with the
language/metalanguage distinction. This matter is by no means settled, and I shall
return to it later. 22
3. Lesniewski’s early Liar
Here follows Le"sniewski’s solution, of which I shall give only the bare bones. 23 The
reason why Le"sniewski o2ers a solution to the Liar Paradox is expressly that he wants
to show that LPC and RLTND, two fundamental principles of his semantics, are not
contested by the Liar and that, therefore, the semantics he has laid down is consistent.
First of all Le"sniewski analyses the Paradox in a way that can be reconstructed as
follows. Epimenides states at time t1 the sentence ‘the sentence stated by Epimenides
at t1 is false’. Let us suppose that the sentence he states is true. ‘Ep’ abbreviates here
below ‘the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1’. 24
(i) Ep is true hyp. 1
(ii) ‘Ep is true’ is true From (i), TL
(iii) ‘Ep is false’ is false From (ii), LPC (since ‘Ep is true’ and ‘Ep is false’
are
mutually ‘contradictory’)
(iv) Ep = ‘Ep is false’ (since the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is ‘the
sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false’)
(v) Ep is false From (iii), (iv), Leibniz’s Law
Leibniz’s law is applied to (iii) and (iv) to get (v), although Le"sniewski does not
say explicitly that here there is an instance of the law. 25 So from the hypothesis that
20 Cf. Le"sniewski [24], Remark III to Section 1, p. 322. Eng. tran. pp. 53–54. It could seem that in this
passage Le"sniewski accepts rather the following: the sentence “a is b’ is true” is true i2 ‘a is b’ is true.
The latter is enough to assume for Le"sniewski’s analysis of the Liar.
21 Bar perhaps Frege, who, however, was older than—and at that time unknown to—Le"sniewski. For a
particularly clear example cf. Le"sniewski [21], Remark to Section 1, p. 329; Eng. tran. p. 1.
22 Cf. infra Section 6.2.
23 Cf. Le"sniewski [24], pp. 343–349; Eng. tran. pp. 77–82.
24 The abbreviation is not used in Le"sniewski’s argumentation.
25 Cf. also Tarski [49], p. 672.
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Ep is true it follows that Ep is false, and so hyp. 1 is false, because it leads to a
contradiction. Let us suppose now that the sentence stated by Epimenides is false.
(i) Ep is false hyp. 2
(ii) ‘Ep is false’ is true From (i), TL
(iii) Ep = ‘Ep is false’ (since the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is ‘the
sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false’)
(iv) Ep is true From (ii), (iii), Leibniz’s Law
So from the hypothesis that Ep is true it follows that Ep is false. Therefore, hyp. 2 is
also false because it leads to a contradiction. If both hypotheses are false, it raises a
problem for RLTND, because if the subject of the hypotheses is denotative, RLTND
is false. Moreover, since we have
(1) ‘Ep is true’ is false
(2) ‘Ep is false’ is false
we have also
(3) ‘Ep is true’ is true from (2), RLTND
(4) ‘Ep is false’ is true from (1), RLTND.
and from (3), (4) follows that LPC is false, too. 26 So if the paradox of Epimenides
remains unsolved, Le"sniewski’s semantics collapses.
But here comes Le"sniewski’s solution. First note that Le"sniewski takes ‘the sentence
stated by Epimenides at t1 is false’ as a token, 27 so, more precisely, one should write
it with an index, like
(*) The sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false Epimenides; t1 .
And now Le"sniewski claims that RLTND and LPC are not challenged by the Epi-
menides paradox, because for K the subject of (*) is non-denotative. As a matter of
fact, for K the expression that is the subject of the token (*), ‘the sentence stated by
Epimenides at t1’, as a part of (*), denotes any object that has the properties connoted
by it except itself and objects that have constitutive parts in common with it. But
since the unique object that the subject of (*) could denote is (*) itself, and these two
expressions have constitutive parts in common, the subject of (*) is non-denotative.
The conclusion is, therefore, that the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false. And
the subject of the sentence ‘The sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false’ when it
is stated—for instance—by me in 2002, i.e. the token
(**) ‘The sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false’ab;2003
does, instead, denote (*), and does not possess a constitutive part common with the
expression stated by Epimenides, but only with the expression stated by me in 2003,
namely (**). Therefore (**) is a true sentence, and, for TL ‘(**) is a true sentence’
is a true sentence, etc. The same conclusions hold in application to any other token
of ‘the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false’ stated by any other person at any
26 Cf. Le"sniewski’s [24], Remark I to Section 7, p. 345; Eng. tran. p. 78.
27 See Le"sniewski’s treatment of tokens in the contemporaneous Le"sniewski [23], pp. 508 and 2.; Eng.
tran. pp. 98 and 2.
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other time, with the proviso that it is not Epimenides at t1. From the truth of (**),
or of any other (from (*)) token of ‘the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false’,
follows not the truth of (*), as the Paradox claims, but the truth of sentences which
are composed of the same expressions of (*), which is false.
4. “The natural rapids on the Dnepr”
Much could be said concerning Le"sniewski’s solution, its medieval ancestors and its
contemporary descendants. 28 But these angles appear to be of minor relevance to our
present purpose. It is what Le"sniewski says regarding K that deserves all our attention:
It is absolutely correct that I solved the paradox of Epimenides only because
I accepted 〈K; A:B:〉—had I not accepted it, the paradox would not have been
solved. It is also correct to say that the above-mentioned convention is ‘arbi-
trary’ in the sense that it conIicts with ‘natural’ ‘tendencies of development’ of
language. These latter are undoubtedly contravened in my ‘laws’ by the fact that
certain connoting expressions are not supposed to represent all objects which have
the properties connoted by the given expressions. Such remarks, I say, would be
totally justi/ed—they could not, however, depreciate my arguments in any way.
Since, keeping to ‘natural tendencies of development’ of language we get in-
volved in irresolvable paradoxes, these ‘tendencies’ seem to imply contradiction
in themselves. [: : :] ‘scienti/c’ language can eliminate various contradictions only
departing from some schemas of ‘natural language’; its value will depend on how
much it succeeds in eliminating contradictions. ‘Scienti/c’ language ‘arti/cially’
framed by exactly de/ned conventions is a far better instrument of reason than
language dissolving in the opaque contours of ‘natural’ habits which often imply
incurable contradictions—much as the ‘arti/cially’ regulated Panama Canal is a
better waterway than the ‘natural’ rapids on the Dnepr. 29
There are at least three important issues to be noticed in connection with the introduc-
tion of K and with the passage just quoted.
The /rst regards the distinction philosophers usually describe as the token/type dis-
tinction. Without using this terminology, which he never employed, Le"sniewski makes
explicit the ontological status of the entities which play the role of truth-bearers, namely
token-sentences. It should be noted that in Le"sniewski’s later formal systems the ter-
minological explanations for the e2ective construction of the systems speak of token-
expressions. His nominalism /nds its roots here. Note also that this is an element
which distinguishes Le"sniewski’s analysis from Tarski’s Concept of Truth, where the
notion of equiformity, a fundamental notion in the architecture of Le"sniewski’s later
systems, is not taken into account formally. Roughly put, equiformity is the property
28 The nearest resolutions seem to be the Ockham-Pseudo-Sherwood-Burley one analyzed by Simmons in
his stimulating [37], pp. 83–98, that of Buridan’s Sophismata, ch. 8 (better, the Hughes–Buridan’s solution
in Hughes [14], pp. 23–29) and in very many respects Simmons’ own resolution, op. cit., pp. 98 2.
29 Cf. Le"sniewski [24], Remark II to Section 7, p. 349; Eng. tran. p. 82 (reproduced here with changes, and
the addition of the passage from “scienti/c’ language” to “contradictions”), my emphasis. Cf. also Rojszczak
[36], p. 160.
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shared by two token-expressions of the same type. Tarski stipulates that in his mono-
graph expressions like ‘expression’, ‘sentence’ and so on are not common names of
the inscription enclosed in the quotation marks and of any other inscription equiform
to it, but singular names of classes of equiform expressions, respectively, of sen-
tences and so on. 30 In his systems Le"sniewski considered only concrete inscriptions
which have been actually written down, token-sentences (equipped with meaning),
and not type-sentences. The language of Le"sniewski’s systems is a language which
grows, and the directives for the e2ective construction of a system of protothetic, on-
tology or mereology are always relative to a particular stage of development of that
system. 31
The second important element concerns the fact that natural language has a super-
abundance of expressive means, to the extent that only by limiting this superabundance
can we solve the contradictions which we get involved in while operating with natural
language, as the Epimenides paradox shows. Here, in particular, the limitation at issue
regards self-reference in the sense of K.
The third important fact is connected with the second, and regards the (non-) ‘natu-
rality’ of the language for which Le"sniewski’s solution is designed. The point is very
interesting, and rather complicated, as it is also linked with Le"sniewski’s distinction
between metalanguage and object-language, which, as previously mentioned, has not
yet been discussed in the right perspective. We may /rst ask: does the distinction come
from Le"sniewski? and do we /nd it in his early papers? The answer to the /rst ques-
tion is in the aErmative, as it will be clearer in the following section. Tarski’s failure
to ascribe the distinction properly to Le"sniewski is indeed one for which he deserves
to be blamed, and one of the greatest historical distortions to Le"sniewski’s detriment
to which Tarski contributed. As a result, Tarski’s, and not Le"sniewski’s, name is now
most intimately associated with it.
Another question is, however, whether we /nd the distinction in Le"sniewski’s early
papers. As mentioned above, Lejewski and Surma believe so. According to Czes law
Lejewski, referring to Le"sniewski’s /rst paper:
Le"sniewski strictly [: : :] complied with the principle of observing the di2erence
between object language and metalanguage or between use and mention to put it
in alternative terms. 32
Surma’s claim is weaker and more acceptable: the early papers contain “the /rst outline
of the distinction between language and metalanguage”. 33 It is correct to say that in
his early papers Le"sniewski observes scrupulously the distinction between use and
mention of words (no matter whether this is the right way of putting it), but it is not
30 Tarski [45], p. 5 n. 5 (= [54], p. 19 n. 5); [46], p. 269, n. 5; [50], p. 156 n. 1. Cf. also [43],
p. 315 n. 2; Eng. tran. p. 31 n. 3. The so-called ‘name theory’ of quotation marks was popular in Poland:
cf. Ajdukiewicz [1], p. 5: “The inscription composed of quotes and of another inscription placed inside it
is the name of this latter inscription, as well as of the inscriptions equiform with it”. See also the passage
from Kotarbi"nski quoted in section 6 below.
31 Cf. Luschei [33], p. 118, 6.1.5.
32 Lejewski [20], p. 34.
33 Surma [40], p. viii.
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for this reason that we /nd there the /rst outline of the momentous distinction between
language and metalanguage. 34
To understand correctly what is at issue here, and in what way the early papers
contain a move towards the distinction, one has to take into account an aspect of
Le"sniewski’s early language about which Le"sniewski himself is quite explicit, but on
which misconceptions have often arisen. Le"sniewski did not operate here within a
fully formalized language. Nevertheless, Le"sniewski’s solution to the Liar is not meant
for natural language. Le"sniewski is well aware that in his papers he is discussing
the grammar of regimented language, and it is because of this awareness that we
can say that we /nd here the /rst outline of the distinction between language and
metalanguage. In the language in which conventions, theses and semantic analyses are
formulated, Le"sniewski talks about language which he calls ‘scienti/c language’. The
scienti/c language is (conceived as) regimented natural language, as only language like
this can be an adequate means of investigation in scienti/c practice.
The arti/ciality of this ‘scienti/c language’ is not a negative value: only thanks
to the arti/cial elimination of its pernicious ambiguities—dangerous like the deadly
rapids on the Dnepr, in the quotation—does natural language become an adequate
means for scienti/c argumentation. Le"sniewski’s solution is meant for this language
made ‘scienti/c’, not for natural language. Le"sniewski’s language of 1911–13 is, even
if not symbolic, a partially arti/cial language, which already comprises fragments
of formalized language, and which aims to be formalized in full. In speaking of
conventions, de<nitions, theorems, proofs, rules, and trying to free his formulations
from the typical ambiguities of ordinary language, Le"sniewski created at this stage
something located—very much in the spirit of the medieval tradition—in the mid-
dle between ordinary and formalized language, no longer the former, not yet the
latter.
Whoever wants to do justice to Le"sniewski should consider /rst of all these two latter
connected aspects as making his approach original. Only in this way can Le"sniewski’s
inIuence upon the development of semantics be seen more clearly. The modern ap-
proach is characterized by the idea that paradoxes show something deep and important
about language. It has been argued that the modern treatments of the Liar di2er from
the traditional because of the modern attitude towards paradoxes as ‘crash tests’, un-
der which semantic machineries can fall into a thousand pieces. 35 In this sense the
approach of the Critique seems to be the /rst modern approach to paradoxes. The
thought that paradoxes teach us that there is ‘something to give up in ordinary lan-
guage’ belongs today to logical folkore. Le"sniewski was the /rst, in 1913, twenty
years before Tarski, to point out that this something is its semantic richness. This was
also one of the most important reasons Tarski had to cite his teacher in the Concept
of Truth.
34 I wrongly held the opposite view in my [3], p. 102. Le"sniewski’s criticism of the reading of ‘∼p’ in
Principia Mathematica also concerns just the use/mention confusion, cf. Le"sniewski [27], p. 176; Eng. tran.
p. 190.
35 Cf. Spade [38], p. 253.
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5. The early Lesniewski, Tarski and the hierarchy of languages
Without a doubt Le"sniewski’s 1913 solution has only very weak links with Tarski’s
own solution. It is a contextual solution, it makes use of a ban on self-reference and
is based on tokens, and its direct links to the Tarskian hierarchy of languages as a
way out are to be put seriously in question. The point is related to the language-
versus-metalanguage distinction and to Le"sniewski’s non-natural regimented language
as discussed above, although it remains a di2erent point anyway. The issue is worth
considering, as misunderstandings could easily arise from Le"sniewski’s application of
TL to get a language strati/cation which seems to create a metalinguistic ascent. 36
As Albert Visser pointed out, 37 Tarski’s de/nition of ‘metalanguage’ as “the lan-
guage in which we ‘talk about’ [the object-language] and in terms of which we wish in
particular to construct the de/nition of truth for the /rst language” has to do with the
de<nition of truth, not with Tarski’s solution. That Le"sniewski was at least implicitly
at ease with the distinction does not imply that he himself employed a hierarchy of
languages with distinct truth predicates. Quite the contrary. A major di2erence between
the early and the mature Le"sniewski is that in the former the language is semantically
closed, while this is not the case with the object-language of the later systems, in
which no semantic notions appear (and with this I do not intend to suggest in any way
that a Tarskian hierarchy of languages is to be found in Le"sniewski’s mature thought).
The need for a ban on self-reference like K is symptomatic of the universality of
Le"sniewski’s early language. Consequently, since the language is universal, it contains
its own, unique, truth-predicate.
As TL says, ‘true’ can be applied to quote-names of sentences like ‘a is b’, where
‘a’ can well be ‘a is b’ and b the predicate ‘true’ and, in turn, ‘a’ can be ‘a is b’
and b ‘true’, etc. This, however, does not amount to a conception of distinct logical
languages hierarchically ordered in Tarski’s sense, and plays no role in solving the
Critique’s Liar. The idea of a strati/cation of language is certainly present, but not
that of a hierarchy of di2erent distinct languages. It is rather a classi<cation of parts
of speech; that is to say, the /rst seed of the later theory of semantic categories.
Le"sniewski’s conception in these early writings may be sketched like this: there
are particular sciences as physics, geometry and so on, which treat di2erent kinds of
objects. The sentences of which (the language of) these sciences are composed contain
names to denote their objects. There is a ‘super-science’ which is about all the objects
in general, sentences included, metaphysics or ontology, and metaphysical sentences
contain names for all the objects in general (recall that L"esniewski does not eschew
multiple denotation). Logic is a science which is about only some objects, namely
sentences, and the sentences of logic contain names for (in principle) all sentences of
geometry, physics and so on, as well as for the sentences of metaphysics.
36 There have been misunderstandings at this point, also on my part, cf. Betti [2], p. 104 and Rojszczak
[36], p. 158–159.
37 Cf. Visser [55], p. 635.
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To a certain extent Le"sniewski will retain also later this idea of the single sciences, 38
with one important exception: ontology does not anymore play the role of the ‘super-
science’. The ‘super-science’ that does not presuppose any other science is Protothetic,
the ‘science of /rst propositions’. Incidentally, Le"sniewski’s early choice of meta-
physics as ‘super-science’ comes from the fact that in this period Le"sniewski, like
his Polish colleagues, is not yet familiar with the sentential calculus (the ‘Theory of
Deduction’, as they used to say). 39 If the strati/cation given by TL resulted in di2er-
ent languages hierarchically ordered, then in the Critique the language of logic would
be the metalanguage of metaphysics, and this is evidently not the case.
6. From Lesniewski’s early Liar to the logical systems: Tarski’s background
The diEculties of natural language, Le"sniewski observed, are like the rapids on the
Dnepr: we must remove them through arti/cial regimentation. Rapids on the Dnepr
aside, however, how useful is the Critique for tracing speci/c elements of Tarski’s
background? As previously remarked, Le"sniewski’s thinking, accessible in painfully
few, convoluted publications, underwent considerable change. Some of them can be
reconstructed by painstakingly comparing his early papers with his mature production,
but some cannot, and many aspects of the development of his thought are not yet
known to us. Some probably never will be. If accessible, these elements would cast
valuable light on several philosophical aspects of Le"sniewski’s systems. And on this
would depend, if possible at all, a thorough reconstruction of Tarski’s background.
Le"sniewski did not publish anything between 1916 and 1927. 40 This is particularly
regrettable, since these silent years were the ones in which Le"sniewski developed his
systems and in which he was strongly inIuential upon Tarski, who, on his behalf, gave
fundamental contributions to his master’s enterprise. 41 True, we have Le"sniewski’s
1927–31 ‘autobiographico-synoptical’ reconstruction of his former ideas. But no one
would seriously think that by relying on that we can achieve an adequate understanding
of Le"sniewski’s previous work. 42
Although Le"sniewski’s early papers from 1911–14 are precious for historical reasons
and for providing important insights into the philosophical foundations of Le"sniewski’s
systems, the di2erence between them and his mature publications in logical technique
38 Cf. Le"sniewski [27], p. 179; Eng. tran. p. 193.
39 This second fact should make us aware of the dangers of lifting formal results directly from Le"sniewski’s
early papers. For example, it is evident that Le"sniewski’s early negation is not equivalent to his ontological
negation: ‘A is non-b’ cannot be rewritten as ‘A ¬〈b〉’, because the latter is de/ned as ‘A  A∧¬(A  b)’,
and LTND would be true even if no A exists.
40 To my knowledge the sole work published by Le"sniewski between his [25] and Le"sniewski [27] is a
three-page review of the /rst volume of Sierpi"nski’s Analiza matematyczna, published in the periodical of
the Polish expatriates in Moscow, Echo Polskie. Cf. Le"sniewski [26].
41 One of the most important is Tarski’s de/nition of the conjuction by means of equivalence and the
universal quanti/er, cf. Tarski [41] and Le"sniewski [29], p. 12 2.
42 We can have an idea of how much we have lost by simply imagining not having his early papers, and
comparing what Le"sniewski himself says of them in 1927.
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and sophistication is apparent. The Le"sniewski of the early papers is not the one whom
Tarski met, and although some of the notions and principles which are described above
in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 come—mutatis mutandis—quite close to Le"sniewski’s logical
system of Ontology, taking these papers as Tarski’s sole sources would be groundless.
No one would consider as a serious hypothesis the claim that the Critique had an
exclusive inIuence on Tarski, as if nothing happened afterwards in lectures, “scienti/c
discussions and private conversations”.
Tarski was de/nitely not taught by Le"sniewski in 1919/20 that the Liar could be
blocked by assuming K. But what was he taught? Is there something we can say,
despite the hiatus in Le"sniewski’s published output?
We can safely assume that among the things which Tarski was taught by Le"sniewski
were at least the following: how to analyse quotation marks, the language/metalang-
uage distinction, the idea that truth is language-relative, the notion of a closed lan-
guage, and that natural language is such a language, namely that natural language is
universal. 43 These issues deserve much more than the few rough brush-strokes I am
going to o2er. The delicacy of the matter, however, chieIy due to the lack of textual
/rst-hand sources, should not prevent that something be said at any rate: here below I
limit myself to the /rst two points.
1. The analysis of quotation marks is among the elements which mark a de/nite
distance between Le"sniewski’s early papers and Le"sniewski’s mature works. As we
saw in the Critique, Le"sniewski considered quotation marks as acceptable names of
sentences and of other expressions, so that they are allowed in the ‘de/nitions’, the
‘directives’ and the ‘conventions’ he gives, like TL. In his later writings Le"sniewski
kept using quotation marks only informally and in ordinary language examples, without
ascribing them any role in his logic. 44 Le"sniewski’s analysis of quotation marks is
mainly known through Tarski, but it is in Kotarbi"nski that we /nd the /rst mention of it.
Others 〈Le"sniewski, A:B:〉 question the correctness of the following formulations:
‘The sentence ?p@ is true, hence p’, ‘The sentence ?p@ is false, hence not-p’,
‘p, hence the sentence ?p@ is true’, ‘not-p, hence the sentence ?p is false@ is
true’. And they refer to the fact that the variable ‘p’ appears only apparently twice
in these formulas [...]: once it occurs without quotation marks, once in quotation
marks; but this is something di2erent and here there is no closer connection than
is between the word man which is the name of Jan, Piotr and others, and the
inscription ‘man’, which is the name of each of the words consisting of those
three letters in this order: m, a, n. 45
Therefore, ?p@ must be considered as a syntactically simple inscription: in the name
of sentences ?p@ there is no variable ‘p’, even though quite the contrary seems to be
the case. As Kotarbi"nski says in the note to this passage, the issue is also connected
with Le"sniewski’s method of eliminating intensional functions which was mentioned in
43 Cf. supra n. 2.
44 Cf. LeBlanc [18], p. 3.
45 Kotarbi"nski [15], p. 147, referring to an oral communication by Le"sniewski. See also [17], p. 121. In
[16], pp. 468–469 (Eng. tran. [17], pp. 399–400) Kotarbi"nski refers instead only to Tarski [45].
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general terms by Tarski in 1923. 46 For something which Kotarbi"nski’s passage points
out very clearly is that TL was exposed to the same criticism by Le"sniewski as the
famous
(5) ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white
and, more generally, the formulation
(6) ‘p’ is true if and only if p
underwent in Tarski’s Concept of Truth: that it is not a correct de/nition. 47 On
the other hand, Le"sniewski maintained that if a quote-expression is instead considered
as a syntactically complex expression, then it must be the value of a name-forming
function of one sentential variable argument, and the Liar, like other paradoxes, is
easily obtained, even without making use of expressions like “true sentence”. 48
The problem is not that quotation marks are ‘intensional functors’, however, but
rather that “the entire expression ‘?p@’ is an informal symbol for some name whose
formal de/nition may not be quite the same from one context to another”. 49
2. It has been remarked that although scholars have attributed the language/meta lan-
guage distinction to Le"sniewski, no one has quoted any source, textual or otherwise. 50
As a matter of fact we would seek in vain a clear statement in Le"sniewski’s works
stating literally that he introduced the distinction in the Polish philosophical milieu (let
alone the term ‘metalanguage’). 51 As previously remarked, in the Concept of Truth
Tarski does not credit Le"sniewski with the distinction.
He does so, however, in “The Establishment of Scienti/c Semantics”. Although the
passage is rather generic, it is signi/cant: in Tarski’s writings this is (seemingly) the
only place where Le"sniewski is said to be the /rst to give attention to the necessity
of keeping language and metalanguage distinct and of relativizing semantic notions to
language, as well as to the inadequacy of the ‘monolinguistic’ paradigm.
S. Le"sniewski did this /rst over a dozen years [kilkana?scie] ago with full exactness
and strength. 52
46 Cf. Tarski [41], p. 75; [42], pp. 23–24. Eng. tran. [51], p. 8; Eng. tran. 1998 p. 50. Few know that
the method was also mentioned by Le"sniewski himself: “The speaker does not know [...] of any e2ective
method for a reasonable interpretation and logical ‘mastery’ of the ‘intensional functions’ [...], except the
method of their ‘de-intensionalization”’. Le"sniewski mentions Carnap’s [7] stand as similar to his, but only
in its fundamental conception, as for the rest Carnap’s is “in certain essential details completely incorrect
and leads to untenable theoretical consequences”, cf.  Lukasiewicz et al. [32], p. 236.
47 Cf. Tarski [44], p. 3; [45], p. 9 (= [54], p. 23 and 2.); [46], pp. 268–269; [50], p. 159.
48 Cf. Tarski [45], p. 11 (= [54], p. 26); [46], p. 275. Cf. also [50], p. 161–162. It is diEcult to tell whether
in these latter passages Tarski reported Le"sniewski’s reconstruction of the Liar not involving the predicate
‘true’ exactly as it was. The particular formulation of the Liar-sentence in it comes from  Lukasiewicz [31],
p. 29 (cf. also Wole"nski [56], p. 121) and Tarski denies that Le"sniewski detected the empirical premise
occurring in the reconstruction, cf. Tarski [49], p. 695 n. 7. Incidentally, the editors cause a mistake in the
reprint of this latter (cf. Tarski [52], p. 671) by just reprinting the original text without changing the Liar
sentence accordingly.
49 LeBlanc [18], p. 10. Cf. also Lejewski [19], p. 222 2.
50 Cf. Milne [30], p. 190.
51 Tarski has ‘metalanguage’ only from 1933 onwards (cf. Tarski [45], p. 18 (= [54], p. 34)).
52 “Pierwszy uczyni l to przed kilkunastu laty z ca l ;a wyrazisto"sci ;a i si l ;a S. Le"sniewski”, cf. Tarski [47],
pp. 174–175.
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As ‘kilkana?scie’ means ‘from thirteen to nineteen’, the attribution is in agreement
with the hypothesis that the metalanguage/language distinction was in the 1919/20
package. 53 This is con/rmed by the German version of the paper, 54 and by Tarski’s
1930 letter to Neurath. 55
We saw already in what sense we should look at Le"sniewski’s early writings for an
outline of this distinction and how the point is connected with a strict formalization
of the object-language. It suEces to consider, for instance, Le"sniewski’s 1929 paper
on Protothetic to see the distinction perfected and in full action, a fact which Carnap
acknowledged in the Logische Syntax der Sprache. 56
A Le"sniewskian formalized deductive system is a material collection of theses actu-
ally produced by someone and growing in space and time which begins with axioms,
presupposing a theory of semantic categories (roughly a simple theory of linguistic
types). The ‘oEcial’ systems use a special symbolism of Le"sniewski’s own invention,
which is generally considered the most precise ever formulated. The construction of
such a system is carefully regulated by directives that must be formally stated. These
regard the inscription of axioms, of de/nitions and of new theses in the system. 57
Directives do not belong to the object-language, but to the metalanguage:
Since directives do not themselves belong to the system of Protothetic which they
a2ect, I usually formulated them in ordinary colloquial language. I comment on
particular terms of ordinary language appearing in the directives in a series of
terminological explanations, which are also formulated in ordinary language. 58
In order to save space, however, in this paper Le"sniewski used a mereological metalan-
guage in Russell and Whitehead’s symbolism for the directives and the terminological
explanations. The language of the systems ful/lls the expectation that Le"sniewski had
of the ‘scienti/c language’ of the early writings. Note that Le"sniewskian systems are
interpreted formal systems, in the sense that their language is a language in use, and
their expressions are expressions with meaning. Despite the appearances, the path from
the early writings to the mature logical systems is not one of rupture as one of pro-
gressive systematization, towards a complete separation of language and metalanguage.
The road from universality to its opposite required a formal sophistication which
Le"sniewski did not possess when he was struggling only with the weapons put at his
disposal by Mill, Husserl and the other Brentanians. 59 This path, which passed through
the removal from the object-language of names of the expressions actually occurring
53 Cf. also Luschei [33], pp. 34–35.
54 Cf. Tarski [48], p. 256. GYoran Sundholm attracted my attention to the German passage. The original
passage at footnote 52 above was changed both in the German and the English translation. It is a pity that
the reprint in the precious Tarski [54], containing a comparison with the English translation, fails to signalize
this. The less laudatory German and English versions sound respectively: “(so viel ich weiZ, hat das zum
er ;sten Mal vor 15 Jahren mit vollem BewuZtsein Le"sniewski getan)”, [48], p. 256 and “(Le"sniewski was
the /rst to become fully aware of them)”, [51], p. 402.
55 Cf. Tarski [53], p. 15, 25. Cf. also Milne [35], p. 190–191 n. 7.
56 Cf. Carnap [7], p. 113.
57 Cf. LeBlanc [18], p. 3–5; 13. This work is an excellent presentation of Le"sniewski’s systems.
58 Cf. Le"sniewski [29], p. 59; Eng. tran. p. 468.
59 Cf. Le"sniewski [27], p. 169; Eng. tran. p. 181.
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in the object-language itself, is more visible if seen in the light of the ‘bridging work’
of 1916. Here Le"sniewski still uses quotation marks and semantic expressions like
‘denote’ and ‘true’ in the language of his /rst mereological system, which is already
a far more regimented ‘scienti/c language’ than that of Le"sniewski’s previous works.
Quotation marks as adequate names of expressions and semantic notions still appear
in the context of the object-language. For instance, we read
De<nition I. I use the expression ‘ingredient of the object P’ to denote the object
P itself as well as each part of this object. 60
And
Statement XXVII. The statement ‘If P is an element of the set of the objects m,
then P is m’ is false.
Proof. Let us suppose that the statement XXVII is false. We infer from this that
(1) The statement ‘if P is an element of a set of objects m, then P is m’ is true. From
statement (1) follows that
(2) if P is an element of a set of objects m, then P is m [...]. 61
De/nition I would not be a proper de/nition according to Le"sniewski’s later
requirements. 62 It is very similar to the de/nition of ingredient we /nd in Le"sniewski’s
reconstruction of the system from 1927, 63 but it shares with the later metalinguistic ter-
minological explanations the character of a prescription formulated in the /rst person. 64
Le"sniewski wrote about the de/nitions of 1916 that
The propositions which I called ‘de/nitions’ in the original were propositions
about myself. 65
In Statement XXVII we can see, instead, that Le"sniewski still considers TL perfectly
appropriate. TL is, moreover, just presupposed and used in proofs without having been
explicitly stated as a convention. Although Le"sniewski himself never considered TL as
a de/nition of truth, at this stage neither did he criticize such a view. A very probable
hypothesis is that Le"sniewski’s reIections on the predicate ‘true’ were connected with
his attack on Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica, which involved, among
60 Cf. Le"sniewski [25], p. 9; Eng. tran. p. 132.
61 Cf. Le"sniewski [25], p. 24; Eng. tran. p. 151 quoted with changes. ‘Statement’ translates here
‘twierdzenie’: ‘theorem’, but also ‘assertion’.
62 And it would not be part of any system of logic, as Le"sniewski observed about the reading of the
assertion sign in Principia as “we assert that”. Cf. Le"sniewski [27], p. 174. Eng. tran. p. 187. Incidentally,
from this we can have an idea of the development which de/nitions underwent in Le"sniewski’s philosophy.
63 Cf. Le"sniewski [27], p. 264: “P is an ingredient of the object Q if and only if P is the same object as
Q or is a part of the object Q”; in formal terms: ∀AB (A  ingr (B)↔A  pt(B)∧ (A  B∧B  A)). Eng. tran.
p. 230.
64 Cf. Le"sniewski [29], p. 63: “To the ‘terminological explanations’ [...] I give usually the form of propo-
sitions of the kind ‘Of an object A I say that it is a b if and only if p’ ”. Eng. tran. p. 471.
65 Le"sniewski [27], p. 264 n. 1; Eng. tran. 230 n. 10, here reproduced with slight changes.
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other, the discussion of the meaning of the theses of the system of Principia and the
role of the turnstile, accompanied by the crucial discovery of Frege’s Grundgesetze. 66
7. Fragments of an epilogue: Tarski’s dam and Frege’s ghost
At the time when Le"sniewski wrote the Critique, the rapids on the Dnepr—the
Polish–Ukrainian porohy—were still there, on the last stretch of the river, for 65 km,
from Dnepropetrovsk to Zaporo]zje (‘beyond the porohy’). The Ukraine was sharply
divided in two by the deadly diEcult and well-nigh uncrossable porohy. 67 More or less
in the same years in which Tarski was working on his Polish monograph, whose aim
was “to build—for some given language—a materially adequate and formally correct
de/nition of the term ‘true sentence’”, 68 a gigantic arti/cial, hydroelectric dam project
was started, initially known as the Dneprostoj dam, now as the DneproGES, which,
when it was /nished in 1932, covered the dangerous porohy and /nally made the
Dnepr entirely navigable.
If, as we saw, Le"sniewski and Tarski both agreed on the disease, what about the
cure? Did Le"sniewski agree on Tarski’s gigantic architektonisch raBniertes Dnepro-
GES project? Did Le"sniewski approve of one of the seven wonders of modern philos-
ophy? Underground oral sources have it that the answer must be No. Tarski’s should
have appeared to Le"sniewski an insuEciently intuitive solution to the malady of se-
mantic antinomies. 69
What stand did the mature Le"sniewski take on truth, then? The only place where
Tarski might help us with this is a short report in Polish from 1930/31:
We can try to speak like this: a sentence of a certain system is true if and only
if it is a thesis of that system. 70
Although this was for Tarski, in turn, no suEciently intuitive answer to the problem, we
can be reasonably certain that at the time it was more in accordance with Le"sniewski’s
(Fregean?) view on the relationship between logic and truth. If so, it is no wonder that
Le"sniewski did not anticipate the possibility of a rigorous development of the
theory of truth, and still less of a de/nition of this notion; hence, while indicating
equivalences of the form (T) as premises in the antinomy of the liar, he did not
conceive them as any suEcient conditions for an adequate usage (or de/nition)
of the notion of truth. 71
66 See Le"sniewski [27], ch. I.
67 And as such they were described by the Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz in With Fire and Sword
(1884). Cf. Henryk Sienkiewicz, Ogniem i mieczem, Pa"nstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw, 1962; Eng.
tran. New York, Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing, 1993.
68 Cf. Tarski [45], p. 1 (= [54], p. 14) [46], p. 264; [50], p. 152.
69 “The only method for a real ‘solution’ of the ‘antinomies’ is through an intuitive undermining of the
inferences or assumptions which contribute to the contradiction. An unintuitive mathematics contains no
e2ective remedy for any malady of the intuition”. Cf. Le"sniewski [29], p. 6; Eng. tran. p. 413.
70 Tarski [44], p. 4.
71 Tarski [49], p. 695, n. 7.
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In order to understand why for Le"sniewski anticipating the de/nition of truth in
Tarski’s sense was no option, it is necessary that the gap which separates Tarski from
Le"sniewski in the entire conception of logic and semantics be properly understood.
The whole matter is, however, not an easy one, chieIy and again due to the scarcity
of textual support. What we do know is that, from a certain period onwards, these
two towering /gures grew more and more apart, both personally and professionally. It
seems that the reason for this is to be found in the context of the metalogical turn which
took place in the Thirties. As GYoran Sundholm has suggested, the contrast embodied
by Le"sniewski and Tarski has many similarities with Jean van Heijenoort’s opposition
between logic as language and logic as calculus. 72 The construction of Tarski’s dam
on the Dnepr, and the circumstances under which the triumphant paradigm of logic as
calculus made Le"sniewskian logic appear to far too many an all too unmanageable,
surpassed and superIuous tool, are a major issue in the history of logic. Thus, before
a proper epilogue to the story of Tarski’s dam and its Le"sniewskian origins can be
written, it will be necessary not only that its elements be disinterred in full detail,
but also that a broader historical and cultural understanding of the matter be safely
established.
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